

# Workshop: Securing the Embedded World: Effective Testing



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## Agenda:

10:15 - 10:30: Welcome Coffee

10:30 - 10:35: Introduction (J. Lapon, KUL)

10:35 – 11:00: Strengths and Pitfalls of Embedded Security Testing Tools (J. Lapon, KUL)

11:00 - 11:25: Exposing Remote Access Risks: A WebRTC Analysis Framework (V. Goeman, KUL)

11:25 - 11:50: Onweer: Automated Resilience Testing through Fuzzing (G. Coremans, VUB)

11:50 - 12:00: Discussion



VLAIO/COOCK:

BUGATTI -Embedded Security Testing and Automation



# Partners and User group



# VLAIO Coock

- *Collective R&D and Knowledge dissemination*
  - 3 years (since April 1<sup>st</sup>)
  - user group meetings (3/year)
  - hands-on seminars/workshops
- 
- Goal: Integration in ‘your’ organization


# Goals

## *Security testing of IoT applications*


- *Tools for static analysis of device firmware*
- *Advanced dynamic/pen-testing techniques*

## *Secure configuration, deployment and management of IoT*

- *Infrastructure as code*
- *Attack detection, security-orchestration and incident response*




## DistriNet in a Nutshell




**gent:**

- Embedded Security  
 detection, mitigation, handling,  
 compliance, legislation...
- Privacy Enhancing Technologies  
 anonymization, controlled release and retention of  
 sensitive data...
- System security  
 multi-variant execution, memory vulnerability  
 mitigations...



Research Diversity Dimensions at SOFT

“ SOFT researches **theories, technologies and methods** that are at the basis of, or help to improve, the **construction of software** at all layers of the **software stack** that **begins** where **computer engineering ends** and **goes up** to and includes **application construction.** ”



- empirical research into **secure practices**
- **reactive security** & incident management
- dynamic and static program **analyses**
- **tools** for SCA, SAST, DAST, IAST, RASP
- secure programming **abstractions**
- secure programming **languages**

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# Strengths and Pitfalls of Embedded Security Testing Tools

From CVE Overload to Actions

Jorn Lapon

# Why Embedded Security Testing Matters

AISURU botnet  
Residential Proxy Abuse

## Domain Rankings

Worldwide

Last 7 days

### Top 100 domains

Updated: Oct 30, 2025

Ranked list of domain names

Rank	Domain name	Category
1	google.com	Search Engines
2	14emeliaterracewestroxbu	
3	googleapis.com	
4	cloudflare.com	
5	gstatic.com	
6	microsoft.com	
7	facebook.com	
8	apple.com	
9	overload.su	
10	amazonaws.com	

Page 1 of 10

### Top 100 Internet services

Updated: Oct 30, 2025

Ranked list of Internet services

Service name

1 Google


## Domain Rankings

Worldwide

Last 7 days

### Domain popularity

Top 10 domains based on 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver traffic



# Why Embedded Security Testing Matters

Akira ransomware

## Ransomware gang encrypted network from a webcam to bypass EDR

By [Bill Toulas](#)

March 6, 2025 03:31 PM 5



The Akira ransomware gang was spotted using an unsecured webcam to launch encryption attacks on a victim's network, effectively circumventing Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), which was blocking the encryptor in Windows.

Cybersecurity firm S-RM team discovered the unusual attack method during a recent incident response at one of their clients.

Notably, [Akira](#) only pivoted to the webcam after attempting to deploy encryptors on Windows, which were blocked by the victim's EDR solution.

# Why Embedded Security Testing Matters




EU regulations (CRA, RED-DA,...) now make  
*security testing mandatory* for your products.

# Types of Embedded Security Tools

Category	Purpose	Input	Examples
<b>SAST</b> (Static Application Security Testing)	find coding flaws, memory issues	<b>source code</b>	cppcheck, clang-tidy, flawfinder
<b>DAST</b> (Dynamic Application Security Testing)	trigger unexpected behavior/exploits	<b>running/emulated applications</b>	AFL, CI Fuzz, Aikido DAST, ...
<b>SCA</b> (Software Composition Analysis)	known vulnerabilities (CVEs)	dependency <b>manifests, SBOMs</b>	Grype, Snyk, (build-tools)
<b>Network Scanners</b>	(DAST style) fingerprinting to infer versions and CVEs	<b>network</b> -exposed endpoints of running/emulated system	Nmap, Nessus, OpenVAS
<b>Configuration/Hardening Analysis</b>	check how software and OS are built and configured	<b>image config, file system</b>	Lynis, OpenSCAP, Yocto Security Flags
<b>Firmware Analysis</b>	Combines binary extraction and vulnerability scanning	<b>firmware/binary blobs</b>	EMBA, FACT
... many more ...			

# Known Vulnerabilities

- CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
  - CVE-2023-37822 – responsible disclosure



# Known Vulnerabilities – CVEs Everywhere



## ■ CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

- CVE-2023-37822

### Vulnerability Details : [CVE-2023-37822](#)

#### Eufy Homebase 2 Predictable WPA2-PSK Allows Offline Brute Force and Unauthorized Network Access

The Eufy Homebase 2 before firmware version 3.3.4.1h creates a dedicated wireless network for its ecosystem, which serves as a proxy to the end user's primary network. The WPA2-PSK generation of this dedicated network is flawed and solely based on the serial number. Due to the flawed generation process, the WPA2-PSK can be brute forced offline within seconds. This vulnerability allows an attacker in proximity to the dedicated wireless network to gain unauthorized access to the end user's primary network. The only requirement of the attack is proximity to the dedicated wireless network.

#### Products affected by CVE-2023-37822

[Anker](#) » [Eufy Homebase 2 Firmware](#) » Version: 3.2.8.3h

cpe:2.3:o:anker:eufy\_homebase\_2\_firmware:3.2.8.3h:\*\*\*\*:\*

[Matching versions](#)

[Eufy](#) » [Homebase 2 Firmware](#) **Versions before (<) 3.3.4.1h**

cpe:2.3:o:eufy:homebase\_2\_firmware:\*\*\*\*:\*

[Matching versions](#)

When used together with: [Eufy](#) » [Homebase 2](#) » Version: N/A

#### Exploit prediction scoring system (EPSS) score for CVE-2023-37822

[EPSS FAQ](#)

0.06%

Probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days [EPSS Score History](#)

~ 19 %

Percentile, the proportion of vulnerabilities that are scored at or less

#### CVSS scores for CVE-2023-37822

Base Score	Base Severity	CVSS Vector	Exploitability Score	Impact Score	Score Source	First Seen
8.2	HIGH	CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N	2.8	4.7	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	2024-11-25
8.2	HIGH	CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N	2.8	4.7	NIST	2024-10-29

Great, we can find out what software and libraries are vulnerable and we need to patch!

So what's the problem?

We found **critical** vulnerabilities  
CVE-XXXX, CVE-YYYY, CVE-ZZZZ in your device!

Fix them?

Your Customer

A man with short brown hair and a beard, wearing a dark blue suit jacket over a light blue button-down shirt. He is wearing a blue lanyard with a blue ID badge around his neck. He is looking directly at the camera with a neutral expression.



## Six Insights in CVE management

1. Incorrect entries in CVE Databases
2. Incorrect identification of software packages
3. Unexploitable Vulnerabilities
4. Backporting – patched or not?
5. Build System
6. SBOMs To the Rescue

# 1. Incorrect entries in CVE Databases



# Information Technology Laboratory NATIONAL VULNERABILITY DATABASE



VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2023-37822 Detail

### MODIFIED

This CVE record has been updated after NVD enrichment efforts were completed. Enrichment data supplied by the NVD may require amendment due to these changes.

### QUICK INFO

**CVE Dictionary Entry:**  
CVE-2023-37822  
**NVD Published Date:**  
10/03/2024  
**NVD Last Modified:**  
11/25/2024  
**Source:**  
MITRE

### Description

The Eufy Homebase 2 before firmware version 3.3.4.1h creates a dedicated wireless network for its ecosystem, which serves as a proxy to the end user's primary network. The WPA2-PSK generation of this dedicated network is flawed and solely based on the serial number. Due to the flawed generation process, the WPA2-PSK can be brute forced offline within seconds. This vulnerability allows an attacker in proximity to the dedicated wireless network to gain unauthorized access to the end user's primary network. The only requirement of the attack is proximity to the dedicated wireless network.

### Metrics

- CVSS Version 4.0
- CVSS Version 3.x**
- CVSS Version 2.0

NVD enrichment efforts reference publicly available information to associate vector strings. CVSS information contributed by other sources is also displayed.

#### CVSS 3.x Severity and Vector Strings:

 <b>NIST: NVD</b>	<b>Base Score:</b> 8.2 HIGH	<b>Vector:</b> CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
<b>ADP: CISA-ADP</b>	<b>Base Score:</b> 8.2 HIGH	<b>Vector:</b> CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N



Search bar: Enter keywords (e.g.: CVE ID, sql injection, etc.) Search

Site Search Q

Search tips | Provide feedback

Notice: Expanded keyword searching of CVE Records (with limitations) is now available in the search box above. Learn more here .

# CVE-2023-37822

PUBLISHED

[View JSON](#) | [User Guide](#)

Collapse all

## Required CVE Record Information

### CNA: MITRE Corporation

Published: 2024-10-03 Updated: 2024-10-04

### Description

The Eufy Homebase 2 before firmware version 3.3.4.1h creates a dedicated wireless network for its ecosystem, which serves as a proxy to the end user's primary network. The WPA2-PSK generation of this dedicated network is flawed and solely based on the serial number. Due to the flawed generation process, the WPA2-PSK can be brute forced offline within seconds. This vulnerability allows an attacker in proximity to the dedicated wireless network to gain unauthorized access to the end user's primary network. The only requirement of the attack is proximity to the dedicated wireless network.

### Product Status

[Learn more](#)

Information not provided

### References 4 Total

- <http://anker.com>

## On This Page

### Required CVE Record Information

CNA: MITRE Corporation

### Authorized Data Publishers

CISA-ADP





# EUVD-2023-41696

[Back to the vulnerability search](#)

## Severity

EPSS Score 0.06 %

## Alternative IDs

[CVE-2023-37822](#)  
[GSD-2023-37822](#)

## Summary

The Eufy Homebase 2 before firmware version 3.3.4.1h creates a dedicated wireless network for its ecosystem, which serves as a proxy to the end user's primary network. The WPA2-PSK generation of this dedicated network is flawed and solely based on the serial number. Due to the flawed generation process, the WPA2-PSK can be brute forced offline within seconds. This vulnerability allows an attacker in proximity to the dedicated wireless network to gain unauthorized access to the end user's primary network. The only requirement of the attack is proximity to the dedicated wireless network.

## Affected Product

Vendor:	Product:	Version:
n/a	n/a	n/a

## Advisory IDs 0

## Vulnerability information

Published: 2024-10-03 00:00 Updated: 2024-11-25 21:15 Assigner: mitre

## References

- <http://anker.com>
- <http://eufy.com>
- <https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot24/presentation/goeman>
- <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/woot24-goeman.pdf>



# 1. Incorrect entries in CVE Databases

## CVE-2024-6604 Detail

### Description

Memory safety bugs present in Firefox 127, Firefox ESR 115.12, and Thunderbird 115.12. Some of these bugs showed evidence of memory corruption and we presume that with enough effort some of these could have been exploited to run arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 128, Firefox ESR < 115.13, Thunderbird < 115.13, and Thunderbird < 128.

### Known Affected Software Configurations [Switch to CPE 2.2](#)

#### Configuration 1 ([hide](#))

 <code>cpe:2.3:a:mozilla:firefox:*:*:*:esr:*:*</code>	Up to (excluding)	
<a href="#">Show Matching CPE(s) ▾</a>	115.13	
 <code>cpe:2.3:a:mozilla:firefox:*:*:*:*:*</code>	Up to (excluding)	
<a href="#">Show Matching CPE(s) ▾</a>	126.0	
 <code>cpe:2.3:a:mozilla:thunderbird:*:*:*:*:*</code>	Up to (excluding)	
<a href="#">Show Matching CPE(s) ▾</a>	115.13	
 <code>cpe:2.3:a:mozilla:thunderbird:*:*:*:*:*</code>	From (including)	Up to (excluding)
<a href="#">Show Matching CPE(s) ▾</a>	116.0	128.0

## Number of CVEs in the Linux kernel

(Overflow + Memory; [cvedetails.com](https://cvedetails.com) 2025/11/07)




And it's getting worse



# 2. Incorrect Identification of Software Packages

## 1. Name + version

## 2. CPE – Common Platform Enumeration – naming scheme



version, update, edition, language, sw\_edition, target\_sw, target\_hw, other

# 2. Incorrect Identification of Software Packages

## ▪ Exact identifiers:

- From *manifest files, package managers and SBOMs*

**Sometimes** 'near' exact:

- Package Manager: `libxml2@2.9.14`
- NVD CPE: `cpe:2.3:a:xmlsoft:libxml2:2.9.14`




## ▪ Heuristic identification:


- fingerprints & headers (Network Scanners)
- regex/string matching (binary analysis, firmware tools)

**Often** failures in identification:

- Wrong software **package**
- Partial or wrong **version**



## 2. Incorrect Identification of Software Packages



### CVE-2021-22570 Detail

#### Description

Nullptr dereference when a null char is present in a proto symbol. The symbol is parsed incorrectly, leading to an unchecked call into the proto file's name during generation of the resulting error message. Since the symbol is incorrectly parsed, the file is nullptr. We recommend upgrading to version 3.15.0 or greater.

# 404

## 3. Unexploitable Vulnerabilities

*False Positive ... for now*

### Not Found

The resource requested could not be found on this server!

# 3. Unexploitable Vulnerabilities



## 🚫 CVE-2024-53104 Detail

### Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: uvcvideo: Skip parsing frames of type UVC\_VS\_UNDEFINED in uvc\_parse\_format This can lead to out of bounds writes since frames of this type were not taken into account when calculating the size of the frames buffer in uvc\_parse\_streaming.

**= part of UVC Driver (USB Video Class)**

**kernel module/driver/code  
must be present/loaded to be exploitable**


# 3. Unexploitable Vulnerabilities

- Package not present, or vulnerable code not accessible

function not used, module not loaded, #ifdef ...

- Add CVE to ignore list?
- What if it is used later?
  - ! Make sure that **quietly re-enabling** is not possible !
    - e.g., “nm mybinary | grep vulnerable\_function”
  - Document it

# 4. Backporting



# Backporting – patched or not?


- **Backporting** is the process of porting a software update that was developed for a relatively current version of a software entity, to an older version of the software. [wikipedia]

## enterprise and long-term support (LTS) Linux:

Debian, Ubuntu, CentOS, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL).

Linux-Yocto, BuildRoot, Vendor BSP layers (TI, NXP, Renesas), ...:


- in built-in layers
- in custom code



**CVEs listed may be False Positive (they are patched)**

# 5. Build System

*Your Friend*



# 5. Build System



## ■ CVE detection in Yocto and BuildRoot



- Yocto:

- `cve-check`
- Backporting, false positives: `cve-extra-exclusions.inc`

- BuildRoot:

- `pkg-stats`
- backporting, false positives: `cve.ignore`, `cve.fixed`
- `XXX_IGNORE_CVES` (ignore per package)

# 5. Build System

- Build vs Runtime dependencies
- Static libraries not found in Runtime
- Vulnerabilities not detected:
  - *Incorrectly included dependencies (e.g., not added as build package)*
  - *Patched package overwritten with higher layer unpatched package?*
  - *Removed during layered build*
  - ...

# 6. SBOMs to the Rescue *or Not?*

```
{  
  "bomFormat" : "CycloneDX",  
  "specVersion" : "1.4",  
  "serialNumber" : "urn:uuid:dd1ea568-843e-4800-9000-00000000005b",  
  "version" : 1,  
  "metadata" : {  
    "timestamp" : "2023-09-16T21:43:18Z",  
    "tools" : [  
      {  
        "vendor" : "OWASP Foundation",  
        "name" : "CycloneDX Maven plugin",  
        "version" : "2.7.1",  
        "hashes" : [  
          {  
            "alg" : "MD5",  
            "content" : "538c878ebf89b372876e247d056a3fc5"  
          }  
        ],  
      }  
    ]  
  }  
}
```

Benedetti et al., 2024:


75% of packages in SBOM  
not present (Python)

```
{
  "bomFormat" : "CycloneDX",
  "specVersion" : "1.4",
  "serialNumber" : "urn:uuid:dd1ea568-843e-483a-9f8d-7711622e656b",
  "version" : 1,
  "metadata" : {
    "timestamp" : "2023-09-16T21:43:18Z",
    "tools" : [
      {
        "vendor" : "OWASP Foundation",
        "name" : "CycloneDX Maven plugin",
        "version" : "2.7.1",
        "hashes" : [
          {
            "alg" : "MD5",
            "content" : "538c878ebf89b372876e247d056a3fc5"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

# 6. SBOMs to the Rescue - Experiments

- **Target:** core-image-demo, qemux86-64, Yocto 5.0.13 Scarthgap

	Unpatched CVEs	Vulnerable Packages
1. Yocto	355	glibc libsndfile1 qemu-native kernel



## Six Insights in CVE management

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3. Unexploitable Vulnerabilities
4. Backporting – patched or not?
5. Build System
6. SBOMs To the Rescue

# Lessons Learned – From CVE Overload to Actions

- Database ≠ Truth
- Fixing ≠ simple patching:
  - *document backports, ignore lists,...*
- Document configuration (modules/drivers/...)
- Build systems already hold truth
- SBOMs are only as smart as their source

Interested in joining Bugatti:

Contact:

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[Coen.De.roover@vub.be](mailto:Coen.De.roover@vub.be)

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